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IS LAW DISAPPEARING,'
CiiAAT E. CLA e '
IT is now some years since I visited your attractive Panhandle
State, and T find it good to be back. When I was here in 1929, I be-
gan my visit by attendance at the State Bar meeting in White Sul-
phur Springs, where the College of Law presented its now famous
report on the improvement of the administration of justice and the
reform of civil procedure.' Then, after a delightful motor trip
through the Blue Ridge with your colorful Dean Arnold and his
wife, I came at length to Morgantown and enjoyed the hospitality of
the University for an all too brief stay. Perhaps I did not repay
your kindness too well, for I left with designs on your dean, which
"shortly thereafter came to fruition when he came to Yale and on to
that vigorous public career now a part of American history. But I
really felt no compunctions in so doing, because I knew you had an
admirable successor right at hand in my old friend from Yale days
on, Dean Hardman. We from Yale are proud of the effective work
for law and legal education he and his colleagues are doing; and it
is in part, at least, because of my sincere desire to pay tribute to his
work that I was willing to brave the now serious difficulties attend-
ing even a brief trip across country.
* Address delivered at Alumni Day exercises, West Virginia University
College of Law, .Tune 1, 1946. Footnotes have been added.
"'Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
IReport to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform
of the West Virginia Bar Association Containing Siggestions Concerning Plead-
ing and Practice in West Virginia (1929) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 5; Clark, Methods
of Legal Reform (1929)36 W. VA. L. Q. 106.
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In his invitation to me, your dean showed either sublime con-
fidence or shrewd foresight. For he declined any commitment
whatsoever as to the nature of my address or its subject matter.
Quite in passing, however, he was betrayed into disclosing two facts
which stirred my thoughts in a direction which seemed promising.
One was that this occasion marked the resumption of alumni gather-
ings suspended during the war. The other was that recent speakers
who had preceded me on this platform had included West Virginia's
distinguished son, the Honorable John W. Davis, leader of the Am-
erican bar, and the dean of legal educators, Harvard's Roscoe
Pound.2 It seemed therefore fitting at this time to turn my thoughts
and yours towards the kind of law, the state of legal thinking and
of legal adjudication, to which the veterans are returning. And this
appeared the more appropriate because of the apparent deep con-
cern of many distinguished persons as to this very matter. One
must live in an ivory tower, indeed, far away from current legal
writings, speeches, and other judicial diversities, if he can remain
oblivious to the disquietude evinced by our bar leaders over present-
day trends as to legal verities in general, and the courts, the con-
stitution, stare decisis, and the law professors in particular.2 It so
happens that your last speaker, Dean Pound, has expressed this view
in his many public addresses with the erudition and the intellectual
resourcefulness we have come to expect from him on matters about
which he feels deeply. And I found a title for my few remarks here
in a speech he made not long ago to the lawyers of Alabama on the
intriguing topic, "Disappearance of the Law.'"" That law had dis-
appeared was, I gathered, an established fact; all that remained was
to initiate a coroner's inquest to discover how, and perhaps why.
Now I do not share these pessimistic views. Indeed, holding
rather strong convictions to the contrary, it seemed to me 1 should
speak the faith which is in me, however inadequate my testimony
might be.5 I do not share this pessimism even as to the area most
usually thought of as one of receding law, that now occupied by the
administrative agencies. For this, too, is law, vigorous and original,
involving only that natural specialization of function which is in
2 Pound, What is Law? (1940) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 1.
3 Some of these are cited below, including that amazing conjointment of
Holmes with Hobbes and Hitler, infra note 15.
4 (1941) 2 ALA. LxWY. 363.
5 Cf. Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Society (1942) 9 U. OF
Cn. L. REv. 393.
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keeping with modern trends of professional knowledge.6 Nor am I
despondent as to the development of law in its broader jurispruden-
tial aspects, in its expressions of the social relations of man to man,
of man to the political state, of states and nations to each other. On
the contrary, it seems to me that law is now coming of age, that it is
showing maturity and sophistication, along with a like development
in our political thinking. Parenthetically may I remark-for it is
somewhat outside the immediate scope of my subject-that the
most hopeful sign to me as to international affairs is this very so-
phistication or cynicism, if you will, that prevails today. It is much
better to know and recognize the truth, for it is the truth, unadorn-
ed and replusive as it may at times be, which makes the minds of
men free. Absence of the old cliches, of the level of merely con-
ceptual thinking, which led us astray after the last war is our great-
est promise for the future. And so, too, in law, I think the gain over
even a decade or two in directness of thought, in unwillingness to
fool one's self, in courage to follow through on one's thinking, is
immeasurable. And that we owe, as I hope to point out later, in sub-
stantial measure to the leadership of the law schools in emphasis on
,traightforward and hard thinking.
That there has been a substantial, indeed revolutionary, change
in the direction and trend of the law within the last ten years is of
course now one of the outstanding facts of our time. Probably we
who are engaged directly in the administration or practice of the law
in metropolitan areas tend to overestimate the striking and pervasive
elements of public law while we overlook the stability and compar-
ative certainty of the greater part of private law. I expect that a
careful survey would show the practice of the law in many parts of
the country not changed in essential essence from what it was a gen-
eration ago. But to the minds of many, particularly to laymen not
themselves in the toils, law means public and constitutional law; and
the trends in that field condition and color all else. Such a view is
increasingly justified as more and more the activities of government
touch the ordinary citizen. So we do look to the courts, and partic-
larly the Supreme Court, for exegesis of law of the modern world
in which we live. And there the constitutional change of the last dec-
ade, the movement variously considered as "back to the constitu-
a LANDis, THE _Am.ITRTIVE PROCESS (1938), and GELLHOrN, A .mrNs-
TRATWVE LAw (1940), both ably state this point of view.
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tion" or "away from fundamental moorings," depending on the
point of view, has been swift and complete.'
I have had a unique and forceful demonstration of this change
this spring in some personal activities of my own. The Yale Law
School, being faced with the influx of veterans which is the outstand-
ing phenomenon of legal education at the moment, asked me to re-
turn for some work in course; and I have been busily engaged in ful-
fillment of the rash obligation thus too blithely assumed. It so
happens that ten or a dozen years ago, Professor Walton Hamilton
and I initiated a course at that school which we called "Judicial
Process." This was an attempt to illustrate the ebb and flow of
judicial decisions, the response of the legal precedents to the felt
needs of society, as of different periods, through the medium partic-
ularly of Supreme Court decisions on grave constitutional problems.
One of the striking illustrations was the history of due process from
its early limitations, following English precedents, to the assurance
of fair and just procedure, down through its tremendous expansion
with the business development after the Civil War, its contraction
and expansion in early years of this century, and finally its extreme
extension in the early thirties.,
Formerly in presenting this material the teacher was aided by a
dramatic quality in the story, particularly as it was highlighted by
the striking divergence between scholarly sentiment and constitu-
tional practice of the time. Thus I had occasion some years back to
examine the law review comments upon the Hoosac Mills case, Unit-
ed Slates v. Butler, outlawing the AAA, and those upon the Carter
case, striking down the labor-control provisions of the Bituminous
7 This change is well reviewed in Stern, The Commerce Clanse and the
National Economy, 1933-19d6 (1946) 59 HAlr. L. Rnv. 645, 883. Compare the
contrasting addresses before the American Bar Association in 1939: Hogan,
Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines (1939-) 25 A. B. A. J. 629; (1939)
4 JoHl NLARSHALL L. Q. 554; Byrnes, The Coititntion and the Will of the
People (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 667; and Jackson, Back to the Constitution (1939)
25 A. B. A. J. 745. The latter title was also used in an address by E. N. Gris-
wold [1936-37] N. H. B. A. Rep. 149. See also note 13, infra.
8 Hamilton, The Path of Dute Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RE-
CONSIDERED (1938) 180; Clark, Individua ism and the Constitution (1934) 6 N.
Y. ST. BAR BULL. 81, (1934) 57 REP. N. Y. ST. BAn Ass'x 325. The history of
due process has been so often and so ably recounted that citation is superfluous;
but still pre-eminent among all are those masterpieces, Hough, Due Process of
Law--Today (1919) 32 HARV. L. RB. 218, and Pound, Liberty of Contract
(1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454, as well as the many essays of Professor B. S. Cor-
Uin.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [1948], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol51/iss1/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Coal Act.' Of some thirty or forty comments on each case there was
just short of unanimity of agreement in criticism of the rigid oppo-
sition to welfare legislation then made a part of the due-process con-
cept " Such divergence of view forecast a definite breach in con-
stitutional trend; and when it came, it came sharply and violently.
The other night I looked over, somewhat ruefully, a constitutional
amendment I drafted in 1936 which, if passed by the necessary states,
would have supported some of the social-welfare legislation then
under debate. This proposal had some vogue at the time because it
was taken up by the National Consumers League and others interest-
ed in welfare legislation as a desirable way out of the constitutional
impasse. In effect it called for an expanded definition of interstate
commerce to include the production, manufacture, and distribution
of commodities destined for interstate transportation or in competi-
tion with commodities so destined, for protection of civil liberties by
extension of the First Amendment to the states, and for a return in
definition of due process to its earlier meaning of due procedure,
rather than its expansion to include the "fair substance" of legis-
lation, i. e., "due law," in preference to "due process."" Now,
how antiquated and limited appear my suggestions! In sequel, it
has turned out that, without amendment and in a few short years,
,he things now unquestionably permissible to the legislature have
gone far beyond our conceptions of that short, but now quite bygone,
tme.'2
Moreover. except perhaps as to Jehovah's Witnesses, due proc-
e.s has now gone into the background of our legal thinking. It has
yielded the spotlight to other and, I believe, more pressing and more
presently real legal battles. And the point I wish to make is that
this particular development was so essentially inevitable that, so farl
as I can discover, the criticism of the courts now current does not at-
tack that fundamental change. No one apparently now believes that
minimum-wage or social-security or labor-relations laws should be
held to take private property without due process of law. The criti-
cism is rather as to the speed of change, the uncertainty of the prec-
9 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U. S. 238 (1936).
10 See Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 1872-1880.
11 Clarifying the Constitution by Aimendment, Addresses made at the
Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the National Consumer's League, Dee. 15,
2936, 16-22; 81 ColIG. R c. 905 (1937).
12 As shown by Stern, supra note 7.
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edents, and perhaps the lack of continuing respect for what has
been done in the past."3 I need not weigh here the validity of such
criticisms. That is the proper and appropriate subject of present-
day constitutional debate; and there may well be concern as to dis-
ruption of settled practices, however inevitable it may turn out to
be in a period of constitutional change. But this is not a disappear-
ance of law. Far otherwise, it is the inevitable restoration of balance
which was sure to come after a period of repression of legislative
initiative.
But, going beyond this, there seems to me a more direct lesson
for lawyers, for those who would look to the law of the future, than
merely a recession of the pendulum. This, in effect, has been a res-
toration of law to its proper position of the servant of social needs,
not the master. Almost invariably in countries of the world, law
follows the course of the prevailing sentiment of the community.
Only in America do we try to make the law control; or pride our-
selves on subservience to a government of laws and not of men, wrest-
ing Harrington's famous phrase away from the thought from which
it arose."4 Of course, I am sensible of the immediate retort. Know-
ing as we now do the horrors of Nazi justice, do we not need the ideal
of a law over and above the individuals who temporarily comprise
the government? By all means yes, provided, however, we remem-
ber that law is not the end in itself, but only the means to the end of
a government of, by, and for people, not protected and sheltered
minorities. And that. I conceive it, is the wholesome trend of present
constitutional expression.
In much of traditional constitutionalism, there was a paradox
of which the protagonists appear to hold themselves quite oblivious.
I see it in current and quite extensive condemnation of Justice
Holmes as only a materialist, a believer in force--" Hobbes, Holmes
and Hitler," to quote a recent title in the American Bar Association
13 As in Ballantine, The Supreme Court; Principles and Personalities
(1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 113, or Armstrong, review of Swisher, THE GROWTH OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POWz. IN THF. UNITED STATES (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 333; or
even in more extreme statements, such as Kennedy. Portrait of the New
Supreme Court (1944 13 FOrDHAm L. REv. 1; (1945) 14 id. 8; or Moloy,
Second Bate Men on a First Bate Court (3946) 28 NmvswFEK 108; of. Sears,
The Supreme Court and the New Deal-An Answer to Texas (1945)12 U. or
CH. L. REv. 140.
14 CORwiN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) 102-148; FRANIC,
IF MEN WFRE ANGLES (1942) 190-211; Clark supra note 5, at 395; Brown, A
Government of Laws and Not of Men (1943) 17 FLA. L. J. 179, (1944) 5 Ask.
L.&wy. 77; Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F. (2d) 608, 615, 616, 155 A. L. R. 761
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
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Journal.15 I see it in that strildug plea for a parhsal return to the
past-apparently no more can even be claimed-by Professor Vree-
land, "Thu Twilight of Individual Liberty.""' And the paradox
seems to me all prevading in these arguments for a return to a more
glorious past. It is that we are losing our liberty, our freedom, our
'acred political heritage through denial of judicial invalidation of
legislative attempts at amelioration of social wants and unfairnesses.
A fairer and a more general and even opportunity to share in the
good things which American life can offer-that would seem the
essence of true democracy or of the representative republic envisag-
ed by our constitution makers. *When a government fails to sup-
port "all men" in their "unalienable Rights" to "the pursuit of
Happiness," then the people should abolish it for a "new Govern-
ment," "organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. "17 Such was the
conception of our ancestors in announcing the principles of the Dec-
laration of Independence. I suggest, therefore, that not for long
could social-welfare legislation, however misguided or doubtful in
details, be considered a violation of fundamental constitutional
rights, as a deprivation of the liberty to oppress and restrict the
activities of fellow citizens.
Indeed, the movement for government to act for the benefit of
all classes, even those the least privileged in any society, was bound
to outrun the confines of any slow-moving constitutional abstraction.
In 1887. President Cleveland vetoed a bill carrying an appropria-
tion of $10,000 for a special distribution of seed in the drought-
stricken counties of Texas, saying, "I can find no warrant for such
an appropriation in the Constitution and I do not believe that the
power and duty of the General Government ought to be extended to
'r Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 569; Palmer,
Defense Against Leviathan (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 328; and see Nossaman,
Letters to the Editors (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 615. Among other recent articles
may be cited Gregg, The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes (1943) 31 GEo. L.
J. 262; Simms, A Disscnt from Greatness (1912) 28 VA. L. REv. 467; Gannon,
The Moral Law (1945) 14 Fo _Am L. RE:v. 1, (1945) 17 N. Y. ST. BR BULL.
49, (1945) 68 REP. N. Y. ST. BAR ASS'N 383; Lucy, Natural Law and Ameri-
caa Regal Realism; Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a
Democratic Society (1942) 30 GEo. L. J. 493; Dore, Human Rights and the
Law (1946) 15 FORDHAis L. REV. 3; Kennedy, supra note 13; Vreeland, infra
note 16.
10 VREELAND. Tim TWILIGHT OF I n-muA LIErvy (1944), as reviewed by
ralk, (1945) 14 ForDHAm L. Rrv. 261.
17 Declaration of Independence, 2d and 4th sentences.
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the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly re-
lated to the public service or benefit. "Is
How strange that now seems! Recently a law review devoted an
entire issue to "Unemployment Compensation" and the impact of
federal grants and control upon the relief and employment laws of
all the states."0 The importance of this is not merely the substantial
federal funds involved, but the complete and complex interrelation-
ship of federal and local legislation, regulations, and rules. Even
though I have been adjudicating cases upon this and similar legis-
lation for some time, I found the extent of the intertwining fairly
amazing. I suggest that the simple dichotomies of the Locitner and
Adair cases,20 not to speak of those concerning federal-recovery leg-
islation of the thirties, would have proved inadequate for such fields
of juristic thought in any event. These are literally fascinating
problems among which the young lawyer and veteran may find in-
dustry and pleasure in orienting himself. I believe he will be en-
tirely thankful that he can approach them with good, tough-minded
thinking and not the legal cliches unfortunately so justly viewed as
a near monopoly of our profession in the past. The motto we may
well take to guide us is that urged by J ustic e Brandeis in his famous
dissent in the Oklahoma Ice case, "If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold." 2 '
The same thought was steadily expressed, and was repeated in
what I think was his last public appearance, by another famous dis-
senter who at length came into his own as his famous dissents became
the law of the land, our beloved Chief Justice, the late Harlan F.
Stone. On March 16, 1946 Justice Stone spoke in New York at an
anniversary meeting of the Association of the Bar of that city; and
his address, which deserves wide reading, is reprinted in the May
number of The Record, the magazine of the Association.? His clos-
ing remarks were a quotation from Samuel J. Tilden's address at
the formation of the Association in 1869 that the Bar. "bold in de-
fense, and, if need be, bold in aggression," doing its duty to the pro-
fession," can do everything else. It can have reformed constitutions,
1s Quoted in CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 149, from 8 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 557.
10 (1945) 55 YATE L. J. 1-264, articles by fourteen authors on " Uncmploy-
ment Compenmation." I
20 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) ; Adair v. United States, 208
U. S. 161 (1908).
21 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932).
22 1 THE RECORD 144, 154 (1946).
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it c'an have a reformed judiciary, it can have the administration of
justice made pure and honorable." But the Chief Justice did not
limit himself to merely stirring admonition. In the course of his
address he repeated the regrets, expressed in earlier addressCs,2-
at the mistake which the legal profession had made in devoting very
generally its energies to an unsuccessful resistance to the adoption
of the useful device of the administrative agency. "In this," he
said, "it has sometimes seemed to me that the Bar did much to dis-
sipate its influence and to make a wasteful use of its specialized com-
petence," better devoted to guiding the organization of the agencies
and promoting their more efficient and just operation. The creation
of these agencies "has given rise to new problems. whose solution
must ultimately be found by those skilled in the law. Lawyers
ought not to permit themselves, by their indifference to those prob-
lems, to add a second to their first mistake." Recalling his notable
address before the American Bar Association in 1928,14 where he had
pointed out the, ready constitutional means of expanding federal
power through exercise of Congress' power over interstate com-
merce, he stated that clear thinking should have recognized this when
it came, for it was "a legislative and not a judicial-revolution"; and
he added that "for those who wished to play the role of counter-rev-
olutionists, it was a legislative and not a judicial remedy which was
needed. "2 -
I do not know how far these last admonitions of the Chief Jus-
tice will be taken to heart by our profession. It would seem obvious
that in the immediate future the chief counter-trend against past
expansion of federal power must come, as he said, in the legislature;
and in truth this is the outstanding political phenomenon of the
moment. But the ebb and flow of constitutional doctrine has been
so marked a feature of our history, the resort to "the felt protective
influence of the courts so ingrained a characteristic of our thinking,
that further appeals to judicial protection are likely to be made and,
at least occasionally, to meet with favorable response. In the law-
yer's duty to represent all interests and to present diverse points of
view to the courts, he may well be called upon to seek judicial re-
versal, or limitation, of present constitutional concepts. But the
M Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar (1934) 48 HAIv. L. REV. 1;
Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50 HAv. L. REv. 4.
24 Stone, Fifty Years' Wiork of the United States Supreme Court (1928)
14 A. 3. A. J. 428, (1928) 53 A. B. A. RE. 259, (1929) 8 OaEz. L. Buy. 24S.
= Supra note 22, at 149.
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Chief Justice, with his gift of apt description has given us the prop-
er designation of such a trend by referring to it as an appeal for
"counter-revolution." and its protagonists as "counter-revolution-
ists."
And so it seems to me we are witnessing the growing maturity,
not the decline, of law, its adaptation to the needs of modern society,
its growth and adaptability as a device of social control to secure and
advance democratic needs and ideals. We have seen a revolution not
merely in the distribution of power, but also in ways of thinking
about our social problems and their control. In all this the Ameri-
can law schools have played a part of significant leadership which
must be stressed in any account of our times." In their stress on
clear analysis of concepts, of admissions of presuppositions and gen-
erally inarticulate major premises, of the function of law in modern
life, of avoidance of clic. thinking, they have made our legal dis-
cussions direct and clean-cutting. Now a division of opinion in the
court-deplored in some quarters. though Judge Evans, among
others, has shown the value of dissenting opinions as clarifying views
in the close questions before a court of last resort--has the merit
of give and take on the policy consideration of the issue. This has
been the insistence of the law schools; they have striven for an ap-
proach which is hard headed and realistic. Indeed, this has develop-
ed into the form and size of a movement, learnedly discussed in
articles and books-American legal realism.2 8  In fact, it has been
installed, along with Justice Holmes, as the arch villain of the story.
The idea now often reiterated is that Holmes seduced the law schools,
26 Clark and Douglas, Law and Legal Institutions, 2 Recent Social Trends
in the United States, REPORT OP THE PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH COINrMI'TEE ON
SOCIAL TRENDS (1933) 1430-14S8; Clark, Legal Education in Modern Socwty
(1935) 10 TULANE L. REv. 1.
27 Evans, The Dissenting Opinion-Its Use and Abuse (1938) 3 Mo. L.
REV. 120, (1938) 43 CoM. L. J. 468, (1938) 3 JoIN MARSHALL L. Q. .570;
HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (3d ed. 1942) 107, 108.
28 See bibliography in GXRrLAN, LEGAL REAwISm AND JUSTICE (1941), and,
inter alia, Yutema, Jurisprudence on Parade (1941) 39 Micir. L. REV. 1154;
McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists; An Intervention (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 827; Llewellyn, On Beading and Using the New Jurisprudence
(1940) 40 COL L. Rzv. 581, (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 300, 418. The terms "real-
ism" and "realists" have now become so popular among friends and critics
that they probably will stick; but they are unfortunate, as being "boastful"
and misdescriptive and as referring indiscriminately to a large number of legal
scholars who do not form a homogenous group. Probably some of the miscon-
ceptions of what some at least of these scholars have in mind, see notes 13, 15
supra, and 30 infra. stem from these labels. See Frank, Do MEN WEa ANGELS
(1942) App. V, Comments on Some Criticisms of the So-called "Realists" 276-315.
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who, in turn, misled the Supreme Court.20 How the old Justice's
eyes would sparlfe at the very form his posthumous fame has taken.
It is an amazing, but a deserved, tribute to a great figure. And it is
a concession of the strength and force of this new development in
education.n9
I wish there were time to trace more fully the growth and ad-
xance of the American law school, for it is a fascinating story of
odu~ational leadership. Seventy-five years ago the schools in the
main were little more than the places where distinguished lawyers
and judges gave their formal lectures. It was the distinction of the
lecturer that was all important; the school as an integrated unit had
not yet found itself. But when President Eliot called Christopher
Columbus Langdell to Harvard, the opportunity was at hand. How
brilliantly it was embraced is now history. Three cardinal principles
were the basis of Langdell's planning: First, there must be the full-
time law teacher whose career was part and parcel of the school it-
self. Second, there was required the graduate level of instruction,
signalized by the requirement of college training, thus insuring
a student body of sufficient intellectual background to assimilate the
tougher training now proffered. And third, there was the famous
case method of instruction, substituting the live material of concere
experience for the dry abstraction of formal dogma. For a time the
new system had to struggle to win its way. But the gain in deftness
29 The thesis in particular of Dean Xennedy, supra note 13; compare also
the articles in note 15, supra.
no Even so stimulating and fertile a book as NORTHROP, THE MEETING OP
EAST AND WEST (1946) 254-260, is unfair to the "realists", and misstates
their purpose as well as their impact on ancient legal formalism when he ac-
cuses them of lack of an ideal or a philosophy and as looking for mere facts
alone. Indeed, he is guilty of a revil howler in his reference to President Hut-
chins while at the Yale Law School "as he and his colleagues enthusiastically
piled up the empirical social data" at the very time when lack of finances and
the Dean's necessary engrossment in the administrative program which led
later to the Yale Institute of Human Relations prevented any extensive data-
collecting, as the writer hereof well knows. In this movement there was no
lack of an ideal or philosophy, as has often been pointed out, e. g., by Frank
and McDougal, szitpra note 28; Frank, review of FRIEDUANN, LEGAL THEORY
(1946) 59 HAR v. L. REv. 1004, with earlier citations at 1010; Clark-, The Higher
Learning in a Democracy (1937) 47 INT. J. ETHICS 317, 327. In fact, the
criticism now often made is that it was too direct, and immediately practical and
purposive, as in the criticisms directed against the present Supreme Court,
supra note 13. And the movement has obviously not yet produced a synthesis
as far-reaching, as sophisticated, and as compelling as Professor Northrop's own
dynamic reorientation of the world; but give it time! Certainly FRANK in
FATE AND FREEDOM (1945) has directed his attention to philosophy, rather than
data collectingl See also for another search for truth, Pekelis, The Case of a
Jurisprudence of Welfare; Possibilities and Limitations (1944) 11 Soc. REs.
312.
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of thinking, of grasp of analysis, of originality in selecting analogies
and choosing theories and devices, told in results. In due course the
modern methods triumphed everywhere. Then research in law came
into its own. At first there was stress on investigation of legal his-
tory, on thoroughness of analysis, in short on doing better what had
been done before. This in itself stimulated clear thinking, the re-
jection of careless or outworn concepts, the better reading and study
of the legal materials already at hand. But it also led to a re-examina-
tion of what was being done and accomplished in the law, to the
functions which law actually performed and accomplished, to the
sociological and functional approaches to law. to modern legal
realism, to the questioning and inquiring school of the present day.-'
In many ways it was natural that Holmes should become the
paragon, the exemplar, of the modern law school. In his early days
he made legal and historical scholarship real as well as famous.
Then in a long judicial career he took as his guiding star that atti-
tude of inquiring cynicism about concepts which in due course the
schools adopted as their own. Meanwhile he embodied these ideas in
imperishable prose, so lucid and persuasive as to carry conviction by
its very repetition. No one today has expressed or can express law
school objectives and attitudes better than did Holmes two or three
generations ago. But it is a mistake to suppose that all the schools
show today is a warmed-over version of his philosophic principles.
indeed, we can see now that this development was inevitable as an
intellectual necessity of scholarship in law. Had there been no
Holmes, the ultimate development would have been the same. It was
Holmes's fortune to be thie forerunner in the movement and to give
it standing, dignity. and intellectual power from the very beginning.
And now the law school is with us to stay; for better or for
worse, legal leadership cannot be denied it. I know that many decry
its power, and sneer at the "social engineering" which it now under-
takes. Temporarily, the professor became an object of derision; but
I think now there is more widespread appreciation of his worth, as
31See note 26, supra. And it is a healthy sign of life that there are now
renewed soul searchings among the legal educators. Lasswell and MeDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training in the Public In-
terest (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 203; Vanderbilt, The Law SchooZ in a Changing
Society; A Law Center (1946) 32 A. B. A. J. 525; the several articles in (1943)
43 COL. L. REv. 423-485; the symposiums Legal Education After the War (1945)
30 IowA L. REv. 325-441; and the Reports of the Committee on Aims and Ob-
jectives of Legal Education (1945) PROGRAm ASS'N Am. L. SCHOOLS 1124, give
some of the flavor.
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events show how unfortunate has been his departure from public
service. I regard his potential contribution to the social order as
invaluable; and I know that while he makes life often very uncom-
crtable to the judges, he makes it immeasurably more interesting.
Who can say how much the stimulus of a stinging rebuke in the off-
ing from the law school reviews does in keeping judges on their
mental best behavior? My law school days have been my happiest;
and now I value the opportunity to come back to old school associa-
tions, to the bright evaluation of things of the mind which the law
schools give. Those who would curb and hamper this intellectual
freedom and variety are ill-advised. They are the ones who are
pressing for the law's disappearance. For they are attempting to
shut off the richest founts of the law of the future.
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